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As a contribution to the CCW’s third informal meeting of experts on lethal 
autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), this briefing paper focuses on the implications 
of the requirement of situational awareness for autonomous action – whether by 
humans, machines or complex human-machine systems. For the purposes of this 
paper, ‘autonomy’ refers to self-directed action, and more specifically the action-
according-to-rule that comprises military discipline. Unlike the algorithmic sense of a 
rule as that term is used in Artificial Intelligence (AI), military rules always require 
interpretation in relation to a specific situation, or situational awareness.  Focusing 
on the principle of distinction, I argue that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
presupposes capacities of situational awareness that it does not, and cannot, fully 
specify. At the same time, autonomy or ‘self-direction’ in the case of machines 
requires the adequate specification (by human designers) of the conditions under 
which associated actions should be taken. This requirement for unambiguous 
specification of condition/action rules marks a crucial difference between autonomy 
as a legally accountable human capacity, and machine autonomy. The requirement 
for situational awareness in the context of combat, as a prerequisite for action that 
adheres to IHL, raises serious doubts regarding the feasibility of lawful autonomy in 
weapon systems.  
 
The questions surrounding lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are being 
addressed by the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) along 
multiple lines of analysis. This briefing paper is meant as a contribution to discussions 
regarding the concept of autonomy, on the basis of which I present an argument 
questioning the feasibility of LAWS that would comply with International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL).1  This argument is based not on principle, but rather on 
empirical evidence regarding the interpretive capacities that legal frameworks like 
IHL presuppose for their application in a specific situation. These capacities make up 
what in military terms is named situational awareness.2  Despite other areas of 
                                                 
1International Humanitarian Law ‘is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to 
limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer 
participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare.’ See 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (accessed 23 March 2016).  
2 Situational awareness can be defined as ‘understanding of the operational environment in all 
of its dimensions – political, cultural, economic, demographic, as well as military factors.’ 
Dostal, Major Brad C. (2001). Enhancing situational understanding through the employment 
of unmanned aerial vehicles. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Retrieved from 
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progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, it is my assessment that none has 
been made in the operationalization of situational awareness in an indeterminate 
environment of action.  More specifically for the question of LAWS, situational 
awareness as a prerequisite for the identification and selection of legitimate targets – 
what has been named the Principle of Distinction – is not translatable into machine 
executable code. Yet situational awareness is essential for adherence to IHL or any 
other form of legally accountable rules of conduct in armed conflict.  
This assessment is based on my position as an anthropologist engaged for over three 
decades with the fields of AI and human-machine interaction.3  A central aim of my 
remarks (and of my larger body of research) is demystification of the field of AI, 
particularly with respect to clarification of the differences between human and 
machine capabilities. My work in tracking developments in AI and robotics involves 
taking seriously the claims that are made for intelligent machines and comparing them 
to extensive studies of the competencies – perceptual, and also crucially social and 
interactional – that are the basis for associated human activities.  My focus on 
situational awareness in the context of this panel arises not only from the fact that it is 
a prerequisite for lawful action within the framework of IHL, but also because this is 
an area in which I hope that my particular perspective can contribute to greater clarity 
on the key concept of autonomy.  
 
LAWS and The Principle of Distinction 
 
The elements of situational awareness that I believe are most relevant to the question 
of whether LAWS can be adherent to IHL are those that inform the requirement of 
distinction in the use of lethal force; that is, discrimination between legitimate and 
non-legitimate targets.4  I recognize that the requirements of distinction and 
proportionality are closely linked, but insofar as proportionality judgments 
presuppose that distinction has been made, I focus on distinction here.  In the case of 
autonomous weapons, adherence to the Principle of Distinction would require that 
robots have adequate vision or other sensory processing systems, and associated 
algorithms, for separating combatants from civilians and for reliably differentiating 
                                                 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_01-18_ch6.htm (accessed 23 
March 2016). 
3 Before taking up my present Chair at Lancaster University, I was a Principal Scientist at 
Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center, where I spent twenty years as a researcher. I have written 
for both social and information sciences audiences, including two books, Human-Machine 
Reconfigurations (2007) and Plans and Situated Actions: the problem of human-machine 
communication (1987), both published by Cambridge University Press.  In 2002 I received 
the Benjamin Franklin Medal in Computer and Cognitive Sciences, and in 2010 the ACM 
SIGCHI Lifetime Research Award.  In 1983 I was a founding member of Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility, an organisation formed to address the increasing 
reliance on computing in the control of nuclear weapon systems; I am now a member of the 
International Committee for Robot Arms Control, and on the Executive Board of the 
Foundation for Responsible Robotics.  
4 On the Principle of Distinction see 
http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (accessed 23 March 
2016). Denise Garcia (2016: 96) has recently called for what she terms ‘preventive security 
governance,’ focused on the three areas of a) preventing future harm to civilians, b) 
responsibility and accountability, and c) the question of what constitutes a legal and 
legitimate attack.  
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wounded or surrendering combatants from those who pose an imminent threat.  
Existing machine sensors such as image processing cameras, infrared temperature 
sensors, and the like may be able to identify something as a human, but they cannot 
make the discriminations among persons that are required by the Principle of 
Distinction.5  Even if machines had adequate sensing mechanisms to detect the 
difference between civilians and uniform-wearing military, they would fail under 
situations of contemporary warfare where combatants are most often not in uniform.6 
And more sophisticated technologies such as facial or gait recognition are still reliant 
on the existence either of a pre-established database of templates, against which a 
match can be run, or profiles, which are inherently vulnerable to false positives and 
other forms of inaccurate categorization.7  
 
I take as a working definition of LAWS, weapon systems in which the identification 
and selection of human targets and the initiation of violent force is carried out under 
machine control;  that is, these capacities are delegated to the system in ways that 
preclude deliberative and accountable human intervention or what, in the current 
discussion, has been characterized as ‘meaningful human control’.8  This definition 
follows that adopted by UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
                                                 
5 Some opponents of a ban on LAWS imagine scenarios in which the mere presence of a 
human body is an adequate criterion for the identification of that person as a legitimate target.  
But that requirement is counter to the direction in which conflict is moving, as the boundaries 
that designate geographic zones of combat are increasingly fluid and contested.  
6 On the increasing complexity of the combatant/civilian distinction, Christiane Wilke (2014) 
observes that ‘the rise of the figure of the “unlawful combatant” . . . is accompanied by a 
corresponding rise of the figure of the illegitimate, noninnocent, suspicious civilian.’ C. 
Wilke, ‘Civilians, combatants and histories of international law’, 28 July 2014, available at 
http://criticallegalthinking.com/2014/07/28/civilians-combatants- histories-international-law/. 
7 With respect to the development of algorithmic templates for the identification of legitimate 
targets, Susan Schuppli (2015) observes that ‘the recently terminated practice of “signature 
strikes” in which data-analytics were used to determine emblematic “terrorist” behaviour and 
match these patterns to potential targets on the ground already points to a future in which 
intelligence gathering, assessment, and military action, including the calculation of who can 
legally be killed, will largely be performed by machines based upon an ever expanding 
database of aggregated information.’ S. Schuppli, Deadly Algorithms, Continent, Issue 4.4, 
pp. 20-27, available at 
http://www.continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/212. The concern here is 
with an increasing push towards reliance on a priori stereotyping, rather than systematic 
intelligence gathering; it is the unreliability of stereotyping that has discredited this practice. 
On the exacerbation of the problem of targeted killing by LAWS see also Heyns, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/23/47, ‘Report of the special rapporteur’.   
8 For the minimum necessary conditions for meaningful human control see Article 36 (2013); 
Article 36 (2014); Frank Sauer, ICRAC Statement on Technical Issues to the 2014 UN CCW 
Expert Meeting, ICRAC (May 14, 2014), http://icrac.net/2014/05/icrac-statement-on-
technical-issues-to-the-un-ccw-expert-meeting. The word ‘meaningful’ here is meant to 
anticipate and reject the proposition that any form of oversight over automated target 
identification constitutes adequate human control. Horowitz and Scharre (2015: 4) propose 
that in its emerging usage, ‘meaningful human control has three essential 
components: Human operators are making informed, conscious decisions about the use of 
weapons; human operators have sufficient information to ensure the lawfulness of the action 
they are taking, given what they know about the target, the weapon, and the context for 
action; and the weapon is designed and tested, and human operators are properly trained, to 
ensure effective control over the use of the weapon.’   
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Arbitrary Executions, Christof Heyns (2013), who defines LAWS as ‘robotic 
weapons systems that once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator.’9  The emphasis in this discussion is specifically on 
human targets; that is, the identification of humans or human-inhabited objects 
(buildings, vehicles) as lawful targets for engagement.  I am bracketing, in other 
words, defensive weapon systems that operate on the basis of unambiguous signals 
from another (unmanned or uninhabited) device that comprises an imminent threat.  
 
The fundamental problem in meeting the requirements of the Principle of Distinction 
is that we do not have a definition of a civilian that can be translated into a 
recognition algorithm.  Nor can we get one from IHL.10 The 1949 Geneva Convention 
requires the use of ‘common sense,’ while the 1977 Protocol I essentially defines a 
civilian in the negative sense, as someone who is not a combatant.11 While robotics 
may achieve effective sensory and visual discrimination in certain narrowly 
constrained circumstances, human level discrimination with adequate common sense 
reasoning for situational awareness would appear to be computationally intractable.12  
At this point, at least, there is no evidence or research result to suggest otherwise. 
 
Relations of automation and autonomy 
 
While drawing a line between automation and autonomy is necessary in the context of 
the CCW’s deliberations, this does not imply that autonomous systems are not 
automated. The crucial question, rather, is whether or not an automated system is 
subject to meaningful human control.13  We could, in other words, define autonomous 
systems precisely as those in which the identification, selection and engagement of 
targets has been fully automated – this definition still provides a clear distinction 
between automated systems under human control and those that are not (i.e., weapons 
systems that are acting autonomously). 
 
It is also the case that the question of autonomy with respect to LAWS needs to be 
                                                 
9 See also Sharkey, 2012. Scharre and Horowitz (2015: 16) offer a closely related definition, 
but one focused more specifically on the question of targeting, viz.: ‘An autonomous weapon 
system is a weapon system that, once activated, is intended to select and engage targets where 
a human has not decided those specific targets are to be engaged.’ Addressing the key phrase 
‘select and engage’, Gubrud (2014) observes that ‘selection’ or targeting is complicated by 
the fact that ‘the status of an object as the target of a weapon is an attribute of the weapon 
system or persons controlling and commanding it, not of the object itself.’ Target selection, 
Gubrud argues, is where the crucial questions and indeterminacies lie, and the operator, ‘the 
final human in the so called “kill chain” or “loop”’ should be the final decision point.    
10 Asaro (2009) reminds us that IHL comprises a diverse body of international laws and 
agreements (such as the Geneva Conventions), treaties, and domestic laws. These are far from 
algorithmic specifications for decision-making and action. 
11 Art 50(1) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977.  
12 See Sharkey, N. (2008) Grounds for Discrimination: Autonomous Robot Weapons, in 
RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 86-89.  
13  In a distinction consistent with the definition adopted here, Scharre and Horowitz  (2015: 
17) propose the crucial difference as that between a weapon that is selecting targets without 
human decision (‘self-targeting’ or autonomous) and a weapon engaging a human-selected 
target. See also Mark Gubrud, Autonomy Without Mystery: Where Do You Draw the Line?, 
1.0 HUM. (May 9, 2014), http://gubrud.net/?p=272.   
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considered within a longer history of the intensifying automation of warfare. This is a 
trajectory justified as a necessary response to the demand for increasingly rapid 
engagement, along with the vulnerabilities incurred through reliance on complex 
information and communications networks; a problem that greater automation and 
system complexity further exacerbates.  
 
We have seen these dynamics before in the case of launch on warning in nuclear 
weapon systems, and some of the questions currently under debate were addressed, 
and arguably resolved, in the work of computer scientists like David Parnas in the 
1980s.14 In the context of the US Strategic Defense Initiative, Parnas made the crucial 
distinction between a computational system’s verifiable execution of its specifications 
on one hand (what is commonly referred to as the software’s ‘correctness,’ or 
reliability in the narrow sense described in Asaro 2015: 90), and the system’s ability 
to assess the conditions in which those specifications apply on the other (necessary for 
its reliability in operation). Simulated testing of automated weapon systems can assess 
correctness, but it can never definitively assure reliability under actual conditions of 
use. The only way to achieve the latter is through practical methods of iterative 
development based on repeated trials under conditions that closely match those of 
intended deployment, or informed by experience of the system in use, neither of 
which is possible in the case of complex weapon systems with deadly consequences. 
It was for this reason, among others, that the Strategic Defense Initiative was finally 
abandoned. 
 
The US Department of Defense Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2011–2036 
distinguishes automatic from autonomous systems in this passage: 
 
Dramatic progress in supporting technologies suggests that unprecedented levels 
of autonomy can be introduced into current and future unmanned systems. . . 
Automatic systems are fully preprogrammed and act repeatedly and 
independently of external influence or control. . . However, the automatic system 
is not able to define the path according to some given goal or to choose the goal 
dictating its path. By contrast, autonomous systems are self-directed toward a 
goal in that they do not require outside control, but rather are governed by laws 
and strategies that direct their behavior. . . The special feature of an 
autonomous system is its ability to be goal-directed in unpredictable situations. 
This ability is a significant improvement in capability compared to the 
capabilities of automatic systems.15 
 
The key phrase here is ‘governed by laws and strategies that direct their behaviour … 
in unpredictable situations.’ As I have stated above, ‘laws and strategies’ are not 
translatable to executable code.  In assessing the feasibility of the system posited in 
this passage, it is crucial to keep in mind that autonomy or ‘self-direction’ in the case 
of machines presupposes the unambiguous specification (by human designers) of the 
conditions under which associated actions should be taken. And this requirement for 
unambiguous specification of condition/action rules marks a crucial difference 
                                                 
14 See Parnas D.L. (December 1985), Software aspects of strategic defense systems. Comm 
ACM 28 (12): 1326–35; see also Smith, B.C. (December 1984), The Limits of Correctness.  
ACM SIGCAS, Computers and Society: Volume 14,15 Issue 1,2,3,4, Jan 1 1985. 
15 US DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, p. 43, my emphasis. 
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between autonomy as a human capacity, and machine autonomy. As I have argued in 
previous writing, autonomy as we understand it in the context of human action means 
self-direction under conditions that are not, and cannot be, fully specified by rule.16  
This in turn accounts for what we might call the strategic vagueness of any kind of 
rule or directive for action; that is, the assumption that the exercise of the rule, or the 
execution of the directive or plan, will involve in situ judgment regarding the rule’s 
application.  Where the requisite competencies are in place, this openness – far from 
being a problem – is what enables the effectiveness of a general plan or rule as a 
referent for situated action.   
 
Limits to information processing as a model of situational awareness 
 
To make this more concrete we can take the case of the human action-according-to-
rules which defines military discipline, and most pertinent to this discussion IHL and 
the rule of distinction. Because the precise conditions of action in combat cannot be 
known in advance, the directives for action in the case of military operations 
presuppose competencies for their accurate ‘execution’ that the directive as such does 
not and cannot fully specify. Thus the requirement for situational awareness, as 
necessary to effective and, most importantly for our purposes, legally accountable 
warfare.   
 
Approaches to AI-based robotics share the common requirement that a machine can 
engage in a sequence of ‘sense, think and act’.17  It is crucial in this context, however, 
to be wary of the use of evocative terms that imply the functionality of programs, 
rather than providing technical descriptions of actual capabilities.18  Does ‘sense, 
think and act’ refer to an assembly line robot that performs an action at a fixed 
location, in relation to an environment carefully engineered to match its sensing 
capacities, and where the consequences of failure are non-lethal?  Or does it invoke 
sensing and perception as dynamic and contingent capacities, in open-ended fields of 
(inter)action, with potentially lethal consequences?  In the case of human combatants, 
the ability to be goal-directed in unpredictable situations presupposes capacities of 
situational assessment and judgment, in circumstances where the range of those 
capacities is necessarily open ended.  Combat situations, moreover, frequently involve 
opponents who work hard and ingeniously to identify and defeat any prior 
assumptions about how they will behave. This is in marked contrast to the situations 
in which AI techniques, and automation more generally, have been successfully 
applied.  In any case, the burden of proof here must rest with proponents, and require 
a higher standard than general assertions of progress in artificial intelligence, which is 
debatable other than in certain, limited technical areas that do not yet begin to address 
problems of reliable discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate human 
                                                 
16 See Suchman, L. (1987) Plans and Situated Actions: the problem of human-machine 
communication. Cambridge University Press; and (2007) Human-Machine Reconfigurations. 
Cambridge University Press. This problem is not resolved by the promises of ‘machine 
learning’ to enable derivations from data external to the specified rule, insofar as learning 
algorithms continue to rely upon the availability of specified data formats rather than open-
ended horizons of input (see Asaro 2015). 
17 See Suchman and Weber 2016, 9-10. 
18 See Sharkey, N. and Suchman, L. (2013) Wishful Mnemonics and Autonomous Killing 
Machines. AISBQ Quarterly, the Newsletter of the Society for the Study of Artificial 




A final note is that autonomy is best understood not as an individual capacity – 
whether human or machine – but rather as a capacity enabled by particular 
configurations of people and technologies.  Different configurations make different 
capacities for action possible.  In thinking about life critical technical systems, it is the 
question of what conditions a particular configuration affords for human 
responsibility and accountability that is key. This is where the concept of meaningful 
human control becomes crucial: What is required to ensure that delegations of agency 
to machines allow the preservation of human responsibility and accountability?  In a 
report issued in February of this year,20 UN Special Rapporteurs Maina Kiai and 
Christof Heyns wrote that ‘Autonomous weapons systems that require no meaningful 
human control should be prohibited.’ I would add that it is not only the case that 
autonomous weapon systems might circumvent meaningful human control; the 
greater concern is that they could render it impossible. The judgment required for 
effective and legal action-according-to-rule requires time for the assessment of a 
current situation, and decreasing timeframes due to increasing automation close down 
the time available for assessment. The proposed solution of ‘human-machine 
teaming,’ moreover, is only effective to the extent that system designs maintain the 
system dynamics (more colloquially, the time) required to allow for meaningful 
human control.21  This requirement, in turn, poses further limits to weapon system 
automation.   
 
Implications for lawful weapon system autonomy 
 
Conceptual clarity regarding the capacities that enable situational awareness in the 
case of human combatants, with a particular focus on the Principle of Distinction, 
clarifies in turn the requirements for autonomous technologies, and more specifically 
for LAWS.  Citing Article 48 of the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions, Crootof (2015: 1873) observes that one implication of the Principle of 
Distinction is that:   
 
parties are prohibited from using inherently indiscriminate weapons, which are 
usually defined either as weapons that cannot be directed at lawful targets or as 
weapons whose effects cannot be controlled. Additionally, any given attack in an 
armed conflict cannot be indiscriminate: it must be directed at a lawful target 
and cannot utilize indiscriminate weapons or methods of warfare.  
 
The defining question for LAWS is whether the discriminatory capacities that are the 
precondition for legal killing can be reliably and unambiguously encoded in weapon 
                                                 
19Assertions that ‘technology may evolve and meet the requirements [for human target 
identification] in the future’ (cited in Report of the 2015 Informal Meeting of Experts on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), CCW/MSP/2/015/3, 2 June 2015, p. 14), or 
‘Autonomous technologies could lead to more discriminating weapons systems’ (ibid., p. 15, 
my emphasis) do not comprise evidence-based statements of fact.  
20 See Kiai and Heyns (2016) Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and of association and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary or arbitrary executions on the proper management of assemblies, 4 February 2016. 
21 See Scharre, P (2016) ‘Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk,’ Center for A New 
American Security, http://www.cnas.org/autonomous-weapons-and-operational-risk. 
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systems. As noted above, this judgment has becoming increasingly difficult for 
human warfighters, for several reasons. First, the conditions of so-called irregular 
warfare have removed traditional designations of battle zones and combatants, 
requiring much more subtle and uncertain readings of the presence of an imminent 
threat.22  Second, because military systems involve increasingly complex, distributed, 
real-time networks of information and communication, the possibilities have 
amplified not only for strategic accuracy, but also for noise.23 And finally, the 
intensifying automation of warfare has effected a progressive narrowing of 
timeframes for situational assessment.   
 
Lawand (2013) proposes that ‘A truly autonomous weapon system would be capable 
of searching for, identifying and applying lethal force to a target, including a human 
target (enemy combatants), without any human intervention or control.’24  But in the 
parenthetical ‘enemy combatants’ lies the crux of the problem: how is the 
identification of ‘human target’ with ‘enemy combatant’ confirmed?  And what 
uncertainties characterise the category of ‘enemy combatant’ that confound, rather 
than clarify, the problem of legitimate target identification in contemporary warfare?  
Autonomous systems can be made reliable only to the extent that their environments, 
the conditions of their operation, can be specified, engineered and stabilized; these 
requirements do not hold in situations of combat.25  All of the evidence to date 
indicates that this is at best an unsolved problem for machine autonomy, and at worst 
(and this is my position, for the reasons set out above) an unsolvable one. 
 
In sum:   
 
1.  We take as our definition of lethal autonomous weapons, robotic weapons systems 
that once activated, can select and engage human targets without further intervention 
by a human operator. 
 
2.  Autonomy in human or machine systems implies self-directed action, including 
crucially in the case of military operations, action-according-to-rules. 
                                                 
22 Melissa L. Flagg, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense at the U.S. Office of the 
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics' research directorate, 
imagines a situation in which ‘a robotic system is in a battle zone, knows the mission, has 
been thoroughly tested, has the kinetic option, and its communications links have been cut 
off,’ and then asks whether that machine should then make the decision to deploy a weapon 
independently. But it is precisely this clarity that is absent in actual situations of war fighting. 
(Autonomous, Lethal Robot Concepts Must Be 'On the Table,' DoD Official Says,’ Stew 
Magnuson, National Defense Magazine 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2110). 
23 On the intransigence of this problem see for example Patrick Cronin (2008) The 
impenetrable fog of war: reflections on modern warfare and strategic surprise. Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International. 
24 Kathleen Lawand, Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems, INT’L COMMITTEE RED 
CROSS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/09-
03-autonomous-weapons.htm. 
25 It is widely recognized that ‘as the behavior of automated systems becomes more complex, 
and more dependent on inputs from environmental sensors and external data sources, the less 
predictable they become’ (Asaro, 2015). And as the last expert’s panel observed ‘Deploying a 
weapon system with unpredictable effects creates a significant risk of a breach of 
International Humanitarian Law’ (Report, 2015: 15).  
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3.  Action-according-to-rules in the case of human action presupposes capabilities that 
the rules cannot fully specify; in particular, those competencies that are required to 
map the conditions assumed by the rule to actually occurring situations. 
 
5.  In the case of LAWS that would be adherent to IHL, machine autonomy requires 
reliable, unambiguous translation of rules for situational awareness, particularly for 
the identification of legitimate human targets (the Principle of Distinction), into 
machine executable code. 
 
6.  Contrary to assertions regarding the rapid advance of artificial intelligence and 
robotics, there is no empirical evidence of progress in operationalizing the capacities 
of situational awareness that are required for adherence the Principle of Distinction.    
 
7.  This raises serious doubts regarding the feasibility of lethal autonomous weapons 
adherent to IHL. 
 
To conclude, conceptual clarity regarding the capacities that enable situational 
awareness in the case of human combatants, with a particular focus on the Principle of 
Distinction, clarifies in turn the requirements for lethal autonomous weapon systems.  
The defining question for autonomous weapons is whether the discriminatory 
capacities that are the precondition for legal killing can be reliably and 
unambiguously encoded.  My argument is that they cannot, and that as a consequence 
lethal autonomous weapons are in violation of IHL, and should be prohibited.
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Appendix:  Response to questions from Ambassador Biontino’s ‘Food for Thought’ 
paper, distributed to panel participants: 
 
a) Can autonomy in LAWS be best understood or defined in relation to the critical 
functions of a weapon (i.e. the selection, engagement and tracking of a target)?   
 
I would say that the answer is ‘yes,’ and that these are indeed the critical 
functions.  The key term here is ‘selection,’ as it’s there that the question of 
distinction is most salient and, correspondingly, the requirement for 
meaningful human control.   
 
In how far could such an approach be operationalized for the purposes of developing 
regulations and policies on LAWS?  
 
I would assume that it would be possible to assess the key operation of 
‘selection’ in ways that would make a prohibition on LAWS practicable. 
 
b) Can autonomy be defined objectively?   
 
I would say yes, if by objective we mean in a way that is accountable to 
agreed upon criteria.   
 
c)  Is ‘predictability’ a useful indicator to measure the level of autonomy of a system?  
In how far can the notion of predictability be operationalized in a definition?   
 
Predictability becomes problematic as systems (including automated systems 
with human involvement) increase in speed and complexity.  To the extent 
that a human-machine system is unpredictable, it requires the building in of 
adequate opportunities for review and deliberation.  It’s in that respect that 
autonomy introduces a new set of problems. (Cf. the case of launch on 
warning.) 
 
d) Can the level of a weapon system’s autonomy be assessed by a set of indicators?  
For example, physical characteristics, etc. alongside the level of human control?  
What are the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach? 
 
While levels or degrees of system automation can certainly be assessed, 
human control defines the discontinuity that is relevant to the differentiation of 
automated (including so-called ‘semi-autonomous’) from autonomous 
systems.  More specifically, there is a discontinuity at the point where target 
selection and engagement become automated to the extent that human control 
is not an in-built system requirement.  In this sense ‘autonomy’ is a discrete 
system indicator rather than a matter of level or degree. 
 
e)  Does the level of human control of a weapon system assist in identifying what is a 
LAW?  How could the required level of human control be defined? 
 
Yes, the level, or more specifically kind, of human control is key and must be 
defined in terms of the possibility of making a deliberative judgment regarding 
the lawfulness of targets. 
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g) What is the role of human judgment in the targeting process? How is ‘human  
judgment’ put into effect over a weapons system? Does the level of human judgment 
in the targeting process of a weapon system assist with identifying what is a LAW? 
 
Human judgment is key, and irreplaceable, in the identification of lawful 
human targets.  This is the core of my argument, and establishes the limiting 
factor on the legality of LAWS. 
 
h) Are there other approaches to defining LAWS? 
 
I think the current working definition is a sound basis on which to develop 
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